US National Missile Defence

Title : US National Missile Defence

Date : 21 July 2000

One of the great lost opportunities of the end of the Cold War has been the failure of the worlds nuclear powers to address the challenge of getting rid of nuclear weapons. In 1995 the Labor government made a real attempt to generate new ideas and pressures to do something about this by setting up the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, but the Commissions recommendations were abandoned by the current government. Over the past decade, an emaciated international arms control process has limped weakly along, starved of fresh approaches and energy. Instead of new ideas, an old one has again gathered support in the United States the idea of creating a protective barrier against ballistic missiles. Last seen as Star Wars the Reagan Administrations Strategic Defence Initiative it is back now in a new, slightly scaled-down form as National Missile Defence. It uses a technology that, despite the expenditure of billions of dollars, still does not work, and which many scientists believe can never work. The program is ostensibly aimed against nuclear weapons from so-called rogue nuclear states like North Korea and Iraq. That threat has been overstated but even if such states had the capacity or will to attack the United States, they could easily circumvent missile defences by using devices as simple as cargo ships or suitcases smuggled into the country. For many American proponents of National Missile Defence, the real objective is not the diminishing threat of North Korean weapons. They have in mind the grander strategic fantasy of making the United States impregnable to attack from any other power China, Russia or anyone else who may come along in future. The debate has as much to do with domestic American politics as it has with the outside world. The United States is a great country. There is no other state I would prefer to see in the dominant position it now occupies in the world. But its policy makers are not infallible. National Missile Defence is a bad idea which will do far more harm than good. I am a firm supporter of the Australia - United States alliance, which contributes to regional stability. The American forces in Korea and Japan are vital to a stable strategic balance in Asia. In government, I worked hard to promote trans-Pacific regional organisations like APEC that included China, Japan and the United States. I also support the communications and monitoring work of the Joint Facilities which are an important part of Australias contribution to the alliance. But, as the last Labor government firmly established, they are joint facilities and their work must serve both our national interests or at least not stand against the interests of either one of us. And I believe the introduction of a National Missile Defence program would be contrary to Australias interests. This debate is about much more than whether the technology is effective. A successful National Missile Defence deployment would cause the collapse of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence Treaty and threaten the whole idea of mutual deterrence, on which nuclear arms control currently rests. It would poison international relations. It would put on ice all remaining arms control initiatives. Russia and China would theoretically be vulnerable to an American nuclear attack to which they could not retaliate. They would respond by substantially increasing their own nuclear forces. For its own strategic reasons, India would then react to the Chinese build-up, further raising tensions in Asia. As Laurie Brereton has been pointing out, the world, and especially Australias part of it, would be a much more dangerous place. At present the US is the worlds only superpower. But this situation will not continue indefinitely. Within decades, China, India and a united Europe will reassert their power in a more multipolar international environment. A far-sighted policy has to keep this in mind and to construct a system that is flexible enough to accommodate emerging forces within a stable international environment, one in which we all have an opportunity to participate. National Missile Defence is the wrong way of doing this. We are told that Australias participation in the testing of NMD it is a test of our alliance with the United States. And so it is: a test of whether this relationship is robust and deep enough for us to say to our friends, You have got this wrong, and we dont want to be part of it. Weve done it before. We should do it again. Then Australia should throw its weight behind serious efforts to get rid of nuclear weapons entirely. As Mr Howard and Mr Downer may learn, pidgeon-holing reports like the Canberra Commission simply leaves the issues to be resolved by others in ways that suit them.

Title :	US National Missile Defence
Date :	21 July 2000
	One of the great lost opportunities of the end of the Cold War has been the failure of the worlds nuclear powers to address the challenge of getting rid of nuclear weapons. In 1995 the Labor government made a real attempt to generate new ideas and pressures to do something about this by setting up the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, but the Commissions recommendations were abandoned by the current government. Over the past decade, an emaciated international arms control process has limped weakly along, starved of fresh approaches and energy. Instead of new ideas, an old one has again gathered support in the United States the idea of creating a protective barrier against ballistic missiles. Last seen as Star Wars the Reagan Administrations Strategic Defence Initiative it is back now in a new, slightly scaled-down form as National Missile Defence. It uses a technology that, despite the expenditure of billions of dollars, still does not work, and which many scientists believe can never work. The program is ostensibly aimed against nuclear weapons from so-called rogue nuclear states like North Korea and Iraq. That threat has been overstated but even if such states had the capacity or will to attack the United States, they could easily circumvent missile defences by using devices as simple as cargo ships or suitcases smuggled into the country. For many American proponents of National Missile Defence, the real objective is not the diminishing threat of North Korean weapons. They have in mind the grander strategic fantasy of making the United States impregnable to attack from any other power China, Russia or anyone else who may come along in future. The debate has as much to do with domestic American politics as it has with the outside world. The United States is a great country. There is no other state I would prefer to see in the dominant position it now occupies in the world. But its policy makers are not infallible. National Missile Defence is a bad idea which will do far more harm than good. I am a firm supporter of the Australia - United States alliance, which contributes to regional stability. The American forces in Korea and Japan are vital to a stable strategic balance in Asia. In government, I worked hard to promote trans-Pacific regional organisations like APEC that included China, Japan and the United States. I also support the communications and monitoring work of the Joint Facilities which are an important part of Australias contribution to the alliance. But, as the last Labor government firmly established, they are joint facilities and their work must serve both our national interests or at least not stand against the interests of either one of us. And I believe the introduction of a National Missile Defence program would be contrary to Australias interests. This debate is about much more than whether the technology is effective. A successful National Missile Defence deployment would cause the collapse of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence Treaty and threaten the whole idea of mutual deterrence, on which nuclear arms control currently rests. It would poison international relations. It would put on ice all remaining arms control initiatives. Russia and China would theoretically be vulnerable to an American nuclear attack to which they could not retaliate. They would respond by substantially increasing their own nuclear forces. For its own strategic reasons, India would then react to the Chinese build-up, further raising tensions in Asia. As Laurie Brereton has been pointing out, the world, and especially Australias part of it, would be a much more dangerous place. At present the US is the worlds only superpower. But this situation will not continue indefinitely. Within decades, China, India and a united Europe will reassert their power in a more multipolar international environment. A far-sighted policy has to keep this in mind and to construct a system that is flexible enough to accommodate emerging forces within a stable international environment, one in which we all have an opportunity to participate. National Missile Defence is the wrong way of doing this. We are told that Australias participation in the testing of NMD it is a test of our alliance with the United States. And so it is: a test of whether this relationship is robust and deep enough for us to say to our friends, You have got this wrong, and we dont want to be part of it. Weve done it before. We should do it again. Then Australia should throw its weight behind serious efforts to get rid of nuclear weapons entirely. As Mr Howard and Mr Downer may learn, pidgeon-holing reports like the Canberra Commission simply leaves the issues to be resolved by others in ways that suit them.